In today's business environment, team work is omnipresent. But might teams be more prone toward non-compliance with laws and regulations than single individuals despite imminent negative consequences of uncovering misconduct? The recent prevalence of corporate delinquencies gives rise to this concern. In our laboratory experiment, we investigate the determinants of teams' compliance behavior. In particular, we disentangle the e¤ect of deciding jointly as a team of two from sharing the economic consequences among both team members. Our …ndings provide evidence that teams are substantially less compliant than individuals are. This drop in compliance is driven by the joint, rather than the individual, liability of team members. In contrast, whether subjects make their decisions alone or together does not in ‡uence the overall compliance rate. When coordinating their compliance decision teams predominately discuss the risk of getting caught in an audit, and team decision-making is characterized by behavioral spillovers between team members. Holding each team member fully liable is a promising means to deter them from going astray.
Introduction
To comply, or not to comply: that is a question potentially worth billions of dollars as the dividend arbitrage trading scheme 'CumEx'or the Volkswagen emissions scandal show. These recent violations of tax laws and pollution standards, on the one hand, and the strong reliance by companies on team decisions, on the other hand, suggest a dark side of team work: despite enormous …nes levied on companies, the well-documented deterring e¤ect of audits seems to lose its bite when teams make compliance decisions. One crucial di¤erence with an individual compliance problem is the involvement of several agents or parties. In order to run the highly complex share deals of the CumEx tax fraud scheme (which had no economic purpose other than to receive tax reimbursements for taxes that were never paid) employees both within, as well as between, banks, stock traders, and law …rms had to cooperate. In the case of Volkswagen, a team of engineers and managers decided to employ manipulative software to mask the actual emissions level of their diesel engines. Apart from this team decision-making, there is a second crucial determinant of corporate non-compliance. The concomitant economic consequences -the gains from undetected wrongdoing or the losses in the case an audit reveals the misconduct -oftentimes do not arise to the responsible decision-makers alone. Typically, the entire company and potentially also third parties can be a¤ected, such as shareholders via dividend payments and stock prices or customers via quality of goods and services. Thus, compliance decisions within …rms might also hinge on the fact that the economic liability is shared among several agents.
This paper studies what determines teams'compliance behavior. We examine whether dyads as the smallest but yet important size of a team are more prone toward non-compliance than single individuals. Firms, public administrations or the military frequently rely on dyads in the form of dual control in the course of which two persons have to agree on a certain decision. If so, dishonest behavior in teams could either be driven by the joint decision-making of several people. Alternatively, sharing the monetary consequences among the team members might explain corporate delinquencies, too. The separation of these two dimensions also allows for an investigation of how non-compliance by teams can e¤ectively be deterred. In particular, we ask under which conditions an auditing mechanism is suited to address non-compliance by teams. In order to answer these research questions, we run a computerized compliance experiment. Participants …rst 2 earn a low or a high individual income, and then have the choice to report either a low or a high income with the latter being subject to a deduction. Non-compliance, i.e., falsely claiming to have a low income although the true income is high, and thereby evading the deduction, can pay o¤. But an exogenous audit may apply, revealing the underreporting and leading to a …ne. Our incentivized laboratory experiment is based on a 2-by-2 design: along the …rst dimension, subjects either decide alone or in a team on their income reports. The two team members may coordinate before their decision-making via a chat. Along the second dimension, subjects are liable for the economic consequences either alone or in a team, i.e., team members either share their …nal earnings or not. Both dimensions are crucial but as the above mentioned real-world examples reveal they are also intertwined. Therefore, a laboratory experiment is particularly well suited to shed light on this matter.
Our results are as follows. Dyads are signi…cantly more non-compliant than single individuals.
Joint decision-making per se contributes very little to this increase in non-compliance and we …nd no signi…cant e¤ect along this dimension. In contrast, it is the shared (rather than individual) liability which leads to signi…cantly more misreporting and accounts for most of the increased dishonesty of teams. This e¤ect of shared liability is robust and independent of whether decisions are made on an individual basis or in a team. Hence, our …ndings suggest that holding each team member fully (rather than only partially) liable might e¤ectively restore compliance in teams.
Further results indicate that teams successfully coordinate by making their decisions consensually.
In teams whose members decide together, we …nd evidence for behavioral spillovers between team members. This leads to more consequential declaration behavior. More often teams tend to be dishonest, or sometimes honest, for both declarations. Quantitively, most important motivations for (non-)compliance in the team chat protocols include the risk dimension of the compliance task, the monetary consequences of the report, and the concept of being honest.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we summarize the related literature. Section 3 explains the experimental design and our hypotheses. Section 4 provides an analysis of the experimental data, while section 5 discusses the experimental results, and section 6 concludes.
3
As the compliance decision is a speci…c case of the more general question of whether or not to be honest, our study contributes to the literature on deception in teams. This literature focuses on motivations for (dis)honesty but typically abstracts from an auditing mechanism. Whereas Sutter Our focus of compliance behavior in teams is insightful and contributes to the existing literature in at least three ways. First, compliance problems di¤er from mere cheating opportunities, leading to di¤erent behavioral predictions. Besides the intrinsic costs of lying (e.g., Abeler et al. 2014 , Gneezy et al. 2018 , the possibility of an audit introduces extrinsic costs such as monetary …nes, and dishonest reporting imposes a (monetary) risk for the team partner. 2 Hence, our approach of potentially sharing the economic consequences goes beyond the literature studying lying in teams and the associated aspects of positive and negative externatlities to other team members (such as pro-social lying, cf. e.g. Biziou-van-Pol et al. 2015). Moreover, regret or shame may be more 1 However, Barr and Michailidou (2017) show that the introduction of a focal point in the form of a bonus leads to the coordination of reports even in the absence of interaction. Other aspects of dishonest decision-making in teams include the team formation process (Chytilova and Korbel 2014) and the gender composition of the team (Muehlheusser et al. 2015) . 2 Our approach is also promising given the inconclusive …ndings from the literature on individual versus group risk taking behavior. Baker et al. (2008) …nd groups to be risk neutral; Shupp and Williams (2008) pronounced in a compliance framework, which makes the team decision process richer as compared to the cheating problem. Second, including both the liability dimension and the decision-making dimension allows us to identify and to quantify the importance of each of the two dimensions. This is new to the literature. In light of the real world examples of non-compliance sketched above, our …ndings provide answers to important management and policy questions such as if, and under which circumstances, audits might be able to restore honesty in team decisions. More speci…cally, do companies need to take a setback and rely more on the decisions of single employees rather than teams to prevent dishonesty? Should law enforcement hold both parties of a joint non-compliance decision (partially) liable, or rather focus on punishing one party to the full extent? Third, the analysis of the chat protocol enables us to identify the underlying motivations of the compliance decision in a team. Based on that, we can draw conclusions on the relationship of the compliance problem in our setting and the cheating problems studied by the deception literature so far.
More generally, we also add to the literature on tax compliance. Only a few papers experimentally study the role of social interactions within a group for tax evasion. Fairness seems to play an important role, but not social conformity (Fortin et al. 2007 ). Publicly exposing the deceivers in the laboratory deters evasion (Coricelli et al. 2010 ) and can have both a negative contagion e¤ect and a positive shaming e¤ect (Laury and Wallace 2005) . As opposed to individual tax compliance, Abraham et al. (2017) show that joint tax compliance is positively a¤ected by social norms. An inherent feature of team decision-making is also the transmission of information by taxpayer communication about the audit rate and compliance behavior of others, as studied by Alm et al. (2009 Alm et al. ( , 2017 . We contribute to the experimental compliance literature by explicitly studying di¤erences in the compliance behavior between individuals and teams. Our di¤erentiation between the collective decision and the shared economic consequences among the team members is new to the literature and promises important insights for a better understanding of non-compliance and tax evasion.
Importantly, we provide evidence that it is the shared liability that boosts non-compliance and suggest that enforcement policies aiming at this dimension might be particularly promising.
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3 The Experiment 3.1 Design of the laboratory experiment Overview. We use an experimental compliance framework with 10 periods. A period commences with an income-generating stage: each subject i earns with probability 0.2 a low income Y l (400 Experimental Currency Units [ECU] = EUR 8) and with probability 0.8 a high income Y h (ECU 1000 = EUR 20). 3 This binary income structure has two advantages: …rst, it facilitates the computation of outcomes and ensures a clear-cut compliance decision; and second, existence of the low income secures the credibility of declarations of a low income. While no deduction applies to a low income, subjects are supposed to pay a deduction of ECU 400 on a high income. The deduction returns to the laboratory. For declarations of a high income, the deduction of ECU 400 is subtracted automatically from the income without further investigation. In contrast, declarations of a low income are independently from each other audited by the computer with a …xed probability p = 0:5. 4 In the case of no audit or a truthful declaration, no deductions or …nes apply. However, if an audit reveals non-compliance, i.e., if a high income has been falsely declared as low, subjects must remargin the deduction of ECU 400 topped up by a …ne of ECU 200. At the end of each period, subjects receive an overview of their earnings of this period (and of their partners'reporting and earnings in T2 to T4; see below). The unique best choice for subjects with a low income is to be honest about their income. Therefore, most of the subsequent analysis focuses on subjects with a high income since they face a trade-o¤ of whether to be honest or not.
The experiment follows an innovative 2-by-2 between-subjects design as illustrated in Figure 1: …rst, we vary whether subjects decide on their declared income individually or jointly in a team; and second, we vary whether subjects are liable individually or collectively, i.e., on an individual level to the full extent or on a team level to proportional amounts. Figure 2 shows the …ve stages of the decision process in a period of the experiment. In all treat- 3 This stage is implemented as a real-e¤ort task that involves counting numbers on the computer screen to generate income Yi 2 fY l ; Y h g (Abeler et al. 2011 ). With probability 0.2 subjects have to count a few numbers and generate income Y l , while with probability 0.8, they have to count many numbers and generate income Y h . After the successful completion of the task, subjects received the respective pre-determined income. 4 We have chosen a random audit because it is the easiest to understand. Recent literature studies alternatives, such as endogenous audit mechanisms where the audit probability increases with the estimated degree of underreporting (Gilpatric et al. 2011; Cason et al. 2016) or subjects' perceived untrustworthiness (Konrad et al. 2017 ). Our parametrization of incomes, deduction and …ne borrows from Konrad et al. (2017) . Weisel and Shalvi 2015) being the smallest but yet important size of a group. As the main focus of our experiment is to isolate the e¤ect of joint decision-making from the e¤ects of shared liability, we abstract from team dynamics over time and use a pre-announced absolute stranger matching protocol. In addition, we ensure that matched team members have the same income, which leads to an equal playing …eld for both partners. The …rst stage is followed by an information stage (stage 2) where subjects learn of their income(s). Subjects in Treatment 3 and 4 then have the possibility to coordinate on their reports (stage 3), while subjects in Treatment 1 and 2 skip this step and enter the reporting stage directly (stage 4). For procedural reasons that will be explained below, the di¤erentiation between "reports" -a subject's own income statement in stage 4 -and "declarations"-the …nally declared income which may be subject to an audit -is important to our setting. report of her own income and one report of the income of her partner. Hence, i reports R ii and R ij , whereas j reports R jj and R ji . In order to allow for a coordination on the reports before submitting them, team members enter a coordination stage (stage 3) and have the opportunity to exchange messages in a chatbox for 120 seconds. Then, both team members simultaneously make their reports on both incomes. For subject i the two reports R ii and R ji determine the declaration D i of subject i's income in the following way: if R ii = R ji , i.e., if the own income report matches with the partner's report on one's own income, this matched report is registered as declaration Second dimension: Liability. The second dimension varies to whom the payo¤ consequences of a declaration accrue. In treatments with individual liability (T1 and T3), subject i's period payo¤ P i consists only of the earnings E i from the declaration of the own income including the potential deduction and …ne. There are two possible earnings for a subject with a high income: …rst, in the case of an honest declaration
; second, in the case of a dishonest declaration D i = l subject i faces a potential audit with probability 1/2 and expected
In Treatment 1 each subject is self-responsible (with D i = R i ) and the treatment resembles the baseline setting in standard compliance games. In Treatment 3, individual liability means that if one team member conspires to underreport the other team member's income, she herself neither bene…ts from it nor would she face any …nes should an audit reveal the underreporting. To be more precise, a dishonest report R ji by subject j about partner i's income Y i does not impact subject j's earnings.
In treatments with shared liability (T2 and T4), both team members mutually share their earnings. A subject i's period payo¤ is given by P i = 1 2 (E i + E j ) with E i and E j denoting i's and j's earnings including potential deductions and …nes, respectively. Thus, both team members share the potential monetary bene…ts of non-compliance. But in case the random and independent audits traget D i or/and D j they also share the potential monetary costs of a dishonest declaration. This procedure keeps the range of potential earnings comparable to treatments without shared liability and does not change the total stake size of the individual reporting decision.
Implementation and payo¤s. We conducted the experiment in July 2017 at the econlab Munich with predominantly local students. Fourteen sessions took place, each lasting for up to 100 minutes. In each session there were up to 24 subjects, with a total number of 268 subjects (average age 22.6; 51 percent female participants). Subjects were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner 2015) and the experiment was programmed and implemented in z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) . Upon arrival at the lab, subjects were seated randomly at individual cubicles. At each cubicle, subjects found a hard copy of the experimental instructions that were also read aloud by the same instructor before the start of each session. Subjects then answered some trial questions on the experimental setup to ensure a proper understanding of the instructions. After the successful completion, the main experiment with 10 periods started. One period was randomly chosen for the payo¤. Following the …nal period, subjects …rst answered a short questionnaire on the experiment. They subsequently took part in several incentivized post-experimental tests that allowed for additional earnings. First of all, we conducted Holt and Laury's (2002) risk elicitation task to control for subjects' risk preferences in the compliance decision. Secondly, we used the Cognitive Re ‡ection Test (Frederick 2005 ) to identify impulsive and re ‡ective decision-making which might be related to the subjects' ability to …nd the economically optimal solution to the compliance problem. Thirdly, in order to capture aspects such as prosocial or competitive behavior, subjects participated in a variant of Murphy et al.'s (2011) test for social value orientation. This might be related to subjects' willingness to make a dishonest report when their partner is a¤ected. Each session concluded with a socio-economic questionnaire and an overview of the subject's total earnings. Subjects earned an average of EUR 22 (min. EUR 9, max. EUR 31) including a show-up fee of EUR 6 and earnings from the post-experimental tests up to EUR 3.90.
Conceptual framework
In our framework the compliance decision rests on two factors. First, we include the utility from the monetary payo¤ of non-compliance. Non-compliance has the same expected payo¤ along all dimension, but shared liability leads to a more condensed distribution. This is relevant when a subject's compliance decision is a¤ected by her risk preference. Second, subjects may incur psychological costs from an untruthful report which may very well depend on the speci…c experimental treatment. 6 We focus on identical compliance behavior by both team partners and de…ne e Y := Y h 1 2 ( + ). Recall that the random audit mechanism targets each declaration D i separately. We assume u( ) to be strictly concave and increasing in the earnings P i . The treatment speci…c spread of expected payo¤s (in utility terms) of subject i for non-compliance minus compliance read:
Aspects of risk aversion due to the monetary punishment in case of a detected misconduct on the one hand and strictly positive lying costs on the other hand may lead to negative signs of some or even all spreads. In such a case subject i would comply. 7 The subsequent behavioral predictions about the e¤ect of our two dimensions on compliance behavior are based on a comparison of the spreads across treatments.
Hypothesis 1 Joint rather than individual decision-making leads to less compliance.
Proof. Comparing the spreads of T3 and T1, the claim follows directly from the positive sign of (3) (1):
and, in an analogous way, from the positive sign of (4) 12 always enforce an honest report, only deceiving subjects have an incentive to convince the partner to give a dishonest report, too. Thus, arguments in favor of dishonesty might be more frequent and cause spillovers for honest subjects. But this might be quite cumbersome and drive up i's psychological costs of joint decision-making. If that is the case, the inequality of the associated lying costs could become less strict or even reverse, and Hypothesis 1 might not materialize (sharply).
Hypothesis 2 Shared rather than individual liability leads to less compliance.
Proof. Given individual decision-making, a positive sign of the di¤erence (2) (1) would indicate that the spread under shared liabilty is larger than under individual liablity, and, thereby, imply less compliance in T2 than in T1:
The …rst two factors are positive, and the term in square brackets is strictly positive by Jensen's inequality. Since L IL i > L SL i ; the sign of (2) (1) is strictly positive. In an analogous way, the same holds for the sign of (4) Evidence for Hypothesis 2 would not question working in teams or ‡at hierarchies in general, but allude to a more subtle source of non-compliance. Sharing or even fully externalizing the costs of one's misconduct would provide exactly the wrong incentives since it would leed to more noncompliance.
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The report of the own income
We start our analysis with subjects'reports R i (Treatment 1 and 2) and R ii (Treatment 3 and 4) of their own income Y i . This measure of compliance is directly comparable across all treatments. 8 In the following, we focus on potential deceivers, i.e., subjects with a high income Y h : Only they face a trade-o¤ between reporting honestly or evading the deduction and reporting dishonestly.
Subjects with a low income Y l have no incentive to cheat by overreporting their income as the deduction would be due. Thus, they are excluded for the respective period. This leaves us with 2,166 observations from 268 subjects over 10 periods. still ‡uctuates in the …rst three periods while the rate of dishonest reports increases in three out of four treatments. Subsequently, the compliance rate converges to a treatment-speci…c level. 11 We cannot observe strong reversals in the compliance behavior or end-round e¤ects. Therefore, compliance behavior is not the outcome of some speci…c outlier periods but it is a stable pattern.
Comparing the evolution in Treatment 1 to Treatment 3 and Treatment 2 to Treatment 4 reveals that the e¤ects for decision-making are weaker. There seems to be no stable 'compliance gap'along this dimension (compare to Figure A1 in the appendix). The graphs also reveal no evidence of an interaction of the liability and the decision-making dimension, since we observe that the liability e¤ect for both individual and team decision-making are fairly similar. Table 1 con…rms the …ndings in a multivariate analysis. The dependent variable is the misreporting of the own income (coded as a dummy variable). We show e¤ects for a random e¤ects probit regression that takes account of the panel data structure. Column (1) is a baseline speci…ca-tion and includes dimension dummies and a set of basic socio-economic control variables. 12 Joint decision-making has no signi…cant e¤ect on non-compliance, and we cannot con…rm Hypothesis 1.
In line with Hypothesis 2, shared liability signi…cantly increases the probability of giving a dishon- percentage point, respectively). Hence, the two baseline regressions only point toward a negative e¤ect of shared liability on compliance.
1 1 Although we ran pre-experimental practice questions, the most probable explanation is the learning of subjects. Since the shared liability treatments are slightly more complicated than individual liability treatments, convergence takes one to two periods longer. Nevertheless, the between-treatment di¤erences in compliance behavior in period 1 are already broadly in line with following periods, with the di¤erence between T3 and T4 even being signi…cant ( 2 -Test : p = 0:08). 1 2 Control variables include gender, age, number of siblings, and a dummy for students of economics and business administration. In line with earlier literature, we …nd that women are less likely to misreport. Moreover, age is positively correlated to compliance. The alternative speci…cations in Table 1 (columns 3 to 6) include post-experimental tests and further robustness checks. Importantly, the main results from the baseline speci…cations (1) and (2) are robust. Since the audit introduces a risk dimension in the compliance decision, we control for subjects'risk preferences (Holt and Laury 2002) in column (3). In line with the previous literature, we …nd that being less risk-averse (i.e., choosing the risky lottery more often) is positively correlated to higher non-compliance. Cognitive ability, as measured by Frederick (2005) , might in ‡uence the compliance decision as more impulsive subjects may over-or underestimate potential costs. We …nd that re ‡ective thinking is positively correlated to a higher probability of giving a dishonest report (column (4)). As outlined in section 3.1, social preferences might also alter the compliance Figure 4 ). The negative and highly signi…cant coe¢ cient in column (6) indicates that subjects are less dishonest in early periods, which could be due to the initial learning of the game. 13 However, controlling for early periods has no in ‡uence on our main results. We summarize the …ndings above in
Result 1 For the report of the own income (i) joint decision-making has no signi…cant e¤ ect on the compliance rate;
(ii) shared liability signi…cantly increases non-compliance.
The report of the partner' s income and the …nal declaration
Besides the report for their own income R ii , subjects are required to make a report R ij for their partner's income Y j in treatments with joint decision-making (Treatment 3 and 4). The procedure leaves us with two reports per subject in these treatments: a report for the own income and a report for the income of their partner. Each income report is then matched to the report of the partner for the respective income. If both reports match, the report is implemented as the declaration of a subject's income. Vice versa, if the reports do not match, a truthful declaration is automatically applied. A dishonest declaration therefore requires some coordination within a team. does not systematically deviate in one direction. The probability of a subject making a dishonest report and her partner making an honest report on the subject's income is roughly comparable to the opposite case of a subject making an honest report and her partner making a dishonest report on the respective income.
Result 2 Subjects are willing to make a dishonest report on behalf of their partner, even if they are not involved in the economic consequences or are honest about their own income report.
An analysis of the …nal declaration of incomes reveals that the fraction of dishonest declarations is almost identical to the fraction of dishonest reports. For treatments with individual decisionmaking, the fraction of dishonest reports equals the fraction of dishonest declarations by design. For treatments with joint decision-making, the declaration mechanism itself may increase compliance:
if subjects disagree and state di¤erent reports for an income, the mechanism automatically leads to a truthful declaration. Due to high coordination within teams, the tendency toward compliance is very moderate in size but decreases the e¤ect of joint decision-making even further. Non-compliance for declarations amounts to 67 percent in Treatment 3 and 81 percent in Treatment 4 (as compared to 70 percent and 85 percent dishonest reports, respectively). 15 The results of a multivariate analysis on the reporting behavior for the declarations are in line with the results on the reporting behavior for the reports (compare to Table A.2 in the appendix). We summarize our …ndings in Result 3 Subjects'declaration behavior parallels the previous …ndings for their reporting behavior.
The declaration behavior within teams
Figure 6: Composition of declarations within teams
Although joint decision-making has no e¤ect on the aggregate compliance rate, it does in ‡uence the composition of declarations within teams. Figure 6 summarizes the two declarations of a team in Treatment 2 to 4. 16 For each treatment, the upper bar ('Observed') displays the actual composition of declarations as observed in our data. On the lower bar ('Predicted'), we display a pseudo-prediction on the composition of declarations. This prediction assumes that coordination is not possible, and consequently, there are no behavioral spillovers between the team members. The composition of declarations follows a simple calculation based on the observed aggregate compliance rate in the respective treatment. 17 Each bar is interpreted as follows: The slightly gray shaded area 1 6 Since Treatment 1 (individual decision and liability) has no team characteristics, we do not include this treatment here. If the same matching protocol as for the other treatments is applied, the results for arti…cial teams read as follows: 14.0 percent of teams are classi…ed as honest, 46.3 percent of teams are classi…ed as mixed, and 39.7 percent of teams are classi…ed as dishonest. 1 7 In absence of coordination, the predicted fraction of honest teams is the square of the compliance rate (1 subtracted 20 on the very left ('honest teams') refers to the fraction of teams with two honest declarations, the one in the middle ('mixed teams') refers to the fraction of teams with one honest and one dishonest declaration, and the dark gray area on the far right ('dishonest teams') refers to the fraction of teams with two dishonest declarations.
A decision-making leads to a reduction of mixed declarations, and a corresponding increase in mainly dishonest but also some honest declarations. 19 Ex ante, one might rather expect a crowding-out of by the non-compliance rate), the predicted fraction of mixed teams is two times the compliance rate multiplied by the non-compliance rate, and the predicted fraction of dishonest teams is the square of the non-compliance rate. By illustration, the calculation for Treatment 2 is the following: fraction of honest teams is (1 0:79) 2 = 0:04; fraction of mixed teams is 2 (1 0:79) 0:79 = 0:33; fraction of dishonest teams is 0:79 2 = 0:62. 1 8 We measure the correlation of declarations by the phi coe¢ cient, which has a similar interpretation to the Person correlation coe¢ cient but is suited for binary variables. Calculation is based on a 2x2 contingency table of pairs of declarations in teams. Rows re ‡ect the declaration of the own income and columns the declaration of the partner's income. A correlation of zero results when the probability in each of the four cells (honest, mixed and dishonest teams) equals to the product of marginal probabilities (the aggregate (non-)compliance rate). While the phi coe¢ cient is not di¤erent from zero in Treatment 2 (corr=0.04,the case of two honest declarations, as the coordination on mixed declarations might be attractive for risk-averse subjects in this treatment. Instead, subjects seem to adapt to their team partner's compliance behavior.
In summary, the compliance behavior under joint decision-making is potentially two-directional: some teams may be less compliant, and some teams may be more compliant. As the magnitude of both directions is roughly comparable and cancels out, this might explain why joint decision-making has no e¤ect on the aggregate compliance rate.
Result 4 Joint decision-making is characterized by behavioral spillovers between team members.
As a consequence, teams are prone to be either honest or dishonest.
Evaluation of the team chats
The analysis of chat protocols allows for further insights into team decision-making in Treatment 3 and 4. 20 Less than 2 percent of teams abstain from using the chat. Usage of the chat leads to a successful coordination on the mutual income reports (99 percent in Treatment 3 and 96 percent in Treatment 4). The …nding is in line with the low rate of non-matching reports (compare to section 4.2). In half of all chats, the chat is not only a mere instrument for coordination (e.g., typing in a single number as a proposed report), but it is also used for the exchange of arguments in favor or against non-compliance. In early periods this exchange of arguments is slightly more pronounced (57 percent) as compared to …nal periods (46 percent).
Conditional on subjects giving an honest or dishonest report, Figure 7 provides an overview of the frequency with which a particular argument is mentioned in the chat. 21 "Money" refers to the frequency with which the monetary consequences of a report are addressed, while "Honesty" indicates discussions on being truthful. "Rules"refers to the experimental instructions, in particular that subjects were supposed to report their actual income. "Other"indicates discussions about the compliance behavior of other subjects, while "Prev. Audit"captures the experience with audits in Figure 7 : Frequency of arguments mentioned in chat 23 previous periods. Finally, "Risk" refers to the risk dimension of the compliance task.
A comparison between honest and dishonest reporting reveals that arguments are used more often for honest reporting. In quantitative terms, the risk dimension is the most important argument, 22 followed by the monetary consequences of a report, the concept of being honest, and experience with previous audits. Adherence to rules and the behavior of other subjects are mentioned only in a few cases (except for honest subjects in Treatment 4). Overall, the monetary consequences of a report and the adherence to rules are more prominent as arguments for shared liability (Treatment 4), while the reference to previous audits is more pronounced for individual liability (Treatment 3). For dishonest reporting, we do not observe strong treatment di¤erences, while there are evident di¤erences for honest reporting. Both in terms of the frequency and the distribution of arguments, honest reporting in Treatment 4 is di¤erent compared to the other cases and seems to be the most controversial option. Reasoning relies more heavily not only on monetary consequences, but also on the concept of being honest and on compliance with the rules.
As we partially focus on categories of arguments comparable to Kocher et al. (2017) , we are able to relate our compliance task to their computerized deception problem. This gives insights into the similarities and di¤erences of compliance and deception problems. We …nd di¤erences mainly in two aspects: …rst, the frequency of argumentation is higher for honest reporting (and not for dishonest reporting) in the compliance task. Second, the most frequent argument for dishonest reporting is the risk dimension, as compared to the monetary consequences in the deception problem. However, monetary consequences are also relevant for the compliance problem, though mostly for honest reporting. Moreover, both the discussion of monetary consequences and of risk considerations are related to the economic consequences of a report, and therefore indicate a similarity rather than a di¤erence between both problems. Both settings share that the concept of being honest is identi…ed for an intermediate number of chats. Adherence to rules and the behavior of others are only of minor importance for both settings. In summary, the introduction of an audit shifts attention toward the risk dimension and the audit itself, while other motivations, such as the monetary consequences or the concept of being honest, remain important for the compliance task.
Since the design of this study does not focus on the investigation of gender di¤erences, we abstract from gender e¤ects in our main analysis (for an explicit study of gender di¤erences, see Qari 2019, Muehlheusser et al. 2015) . Concerning the composition of declarations within teams (previous section), female and mixed teams tend to be more honest on average, but exhibit a similar behavioral pattern as compared to male teams. An exception is Treatment 3 with less honest pairs of declarations in male teams, which might indicate that individual liability rules are not as e¤ective for male teams. In the chat, male teams tend to exchange more arguments and the argumentation relies more heavily on the risk dimension and the monetary consequences.
Result 5
The vast majority of subjects use the chat to coordinate on the mutual reports. The most important arguments are the risk dimension of the compliance task, monetary consequences, and the concept of being honest.
Discussion
Joint decision-making in our setting is characterized by two main components: …rst, a coordination phase that enables the decision-formation via the chat, and second, the implementation of the decision via the mutual reporting of incomes. Both components are crucial: in the absence of mutual reporting, the coordination phase lacks the need to reach an agreement. Essentially, it is reduced to cheap talk and allows at most for an update on the other's behavior. In the absence of any prior coordination, simultaneous mutual reporting may lead to non-matching reports by design. Coordination could also be feasible without chat, e.g., by the mutual signaling of reporting preferences or by sequential reporting. However, such coordination mechanisms leave subjects with very little in ‡uence on the partner and might not re ‡ect joint decision-making appropriately.
Finally, we ensure that a dishonest declaration is only feasible if both team partners agree on being non-compliant. This re ‡ects situations outside the laboratory in which honest subjects are in a better bargaining position since an honest report is typically a feasible outside option.
The small insigni…cant increase of dishonest reporting along the decision-making dimension is good news and bad news at the same time. On the one hand, the deception literature's doom assessment of team behavior as rather deceptive does not entirely carry over to the more complex framework of compliance. While the rules of the decision situation and the possibility to deceive remain somewhat ambiguous in the standard settings used to study deception (such as the die role paradigm or the mind game), available strategies and potential consequences are clearly speci…ed for the compliance task. Hence, the e¤ect of higher cognitive skills in teams as well as the exchange of information within teams might only play a minor role. Although team decision-making might also allow us to sustain a positive self-image or reputation toward others by putting forward the excuse of having been convinced -or even having been put under pressure -by the team partner, delegating the (moral) responsibility for a dishonest report is only partially feasible. After the chat, each team member makes the two reports on her own and does not face direct peer pressure in the reporting situation. Moreover, honest reporting is always a costless outside option in monetary terms. In Treatment 3, partners do not bene…t from dishonest reporting on behalf of their team partner and disguising the responsibility for a dishonest report of one's own income is particularly di¢ cult. Finally, the role of intrinsic lying costs or social norms might be less pronounced in compliance tasks due to the presence of an audit. The reduction/erosion of these costs/norms in teams, as found in mere deception problems, might therefore have weaker implications. This is in line with the fairly stable compliance behavior over time.
On the other hand, a negative implication is that third-party reporting seems to be ine¤ective in reducing dishonest behavior when agents have the possibility to coordinate beforehand. The reporting mechanism in the joint decision treatments is a form of third-party reporting: successful dishonest declarations require not only a silent approval or non-objection, but an active statement by the team member. This condition leads neither to a large fraction of non-matching reports nor does it prevent successful evasion. In Treatment 3 with individual liability, a potential explanation might be reciprocal behavior: if both partners agree to mutually falsely report low incomes they may both bene…t. However, we …nd that 30 percent of teams coordinate on one honest and one dishonest declaration. Although honest subjects are not dependent on their partner to achieve a truthful declaration, a substantial fraction of subjects are willing to actively assist their partner in being non-compliant. As long as honest subjects are not negatively a¤ected by the non-compliance of their partners, they seem to be more committed to their partner than to being honest. Potential reasons include that honest subjects are afraid of disappointing their team partner or that breaking the agreement of giving a dishonest report on behalf of the partner outweighs the moral cost of making the dishonest report itself.
Unlike for joint decision-making, our results on shared liability are clear-cut: independent of the decision-making dimension, sharing the costs and bene…ts of a dishonest report decreases compliance. In quantitative terms, this dimension accounts for over two thirds of the di¤erence in the compliance rate between Treatment 1 and Treatment 4. An explanation is that the concept of "White Lies" (Erat and Gneezy 2012) transfers to compliance problems, i.e., subjects are more likely to not comply if it bene…ts not only themselves on expectation but also their partners. The magnitude of the e¤ect would be in line with previous …ndings from the deception literature. 23 In addition, despite sharing both the potential gains and losses from the compliance decision, the e¤ect for the loss domain might be more pronounced and shared …nes in turn less of a deterrent.
Moreover, the more condensed distribution of …nal earnings for shared liability might induce subjects to not comply more often, although the expected value of non-compliance is the same under Although shared liability increases non-compliance independent of the decision-making dimension, team decision-making seems to crowd out the intermediate case of mixed (one honest and one dishonest) declarations. This indicates that those honest subjects who support the non-compliance of their partner for individual liability might be more prone toward dishonesty for shared liability themselves. For example, their dishonest partners might convince them to deceive (dishonest partners have an incentive to do so for shared liability), or they might turn dishonest since sharing the consequences of the declaration of their own and their partner's income reduces the risk on their …nal earnings. Therefore, at least for settings with a positive expected value of non-compliance, the combination of shared liability and joint decision-making is detrimental.
Implications arise to the design of the internal structures of companies or organizations. Importantly, team decision-making per se is not the major source of non-compliance in group settings.
Hence, there is no need for …rms to forgo the bene…ts of team work in order to induce more honest decisions by its employees. Instead, our results suggest that it is su¢ cient to set liability rules right, meaning that each team member could be fully rather than just partially economically liable. 
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Team decisions are widespread, and …rms heavily rely on team work. However, recent corporate scandals suggest that team decisions may also have a dark side: teams seem to be more dishonest than individual decision-makers. In this paper, we study the compliance decision of dyads as the smallest form of teams in a laboratory experiment. We ask whether the compliance behavior of teams is di¤erent from the compliance behavior of individuals and identify the e¤ect of key di¤erences to individual decisions. The …rst dimension of our 2-by-2 between-subjects design varies whether the compliance decision is made individually or in a team. Teams coordinate via a chat and each member subsequently reports both the own income and the income of the team member.
The second dimension varies whether the monetary consequences of the (non-)compliance decision, in particular gains from undetected non-compliance and losses in the case of an audit, accrue only to the respective subject alone or if they are shared between both team members. This allows us to answer an even more important question, namely how non-compliance by teams can e¤ectively be deterred. Speci…cally, we ask under which conditions an auditing mechanism is suited to address non-compliance by teams.
We …nd signi…cantly more dishonesty in dyads as compared to individuals. This e¤ect can mainly be attributed to the liability dimension: independent of whether the compliance decision is made on an individual basis or in teams, shared economic consequences among team members lead to signi…cantly increased non-compliance. In contrast, the impact of team decision-making is small and we …nd no signi…cant e¤ect along this dimension. Hence, the increased non-compliance of teams is explained by shared liability rather than the team decision-making. Further results indicate that decisions in teams are characterized by a low rate of disagreement in terms of non-matching reports and a medium to high correlation of reporting behavior. Most important motivations for (non-)compliance include the risk dimension of the compliance task and the monetary consequences of a report. Our …ndings are corroborated by di¤erent robustness checks. An implication of these insights for …rms or organizations in general, is that team structures do not necessarily lead to more non-compliance. Corporate misconduct as with Volkswagen in the diesel emission scandal can not necessarily be explained by group decision-making per se. Rather, spreading the economic consequences among several engineers and managers seems to be the cause. In order to restore compliance within teams, it is advisable to prohibit sharing of consequences but to place an emphasis on the full liability of each individual team member. of a random effects probit specification with dishonest declarations (binary variable) as the dependent variable. "Joint Decision" is a dummy variable that indicates treatments with joint decision-making, "Shared Liability" is a dummy variable that indicates treatments with shared payoffs, and "Joint Dec. x Shared Liab." is the interaction between both dummies. The reference group is Treatment 1 with individual payoffs and individual decision-making. "Early Period" is a dummy variable for periods 1 -3. "Post Tests" include control variables for risk aversion (Holt and Laury 2002) , the Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick 2005 ) and distributional preferences (Murphy et al. 2011) . Standard errors are given in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
VARIABLES
(1) (2) (3) with our previous analysis of dishonest reports ( Table 1 ). The two baseline speci…cations include dimension dummies (column 1) and an interaction term (column 2). Shared liability signi…cantly increases the probability of a dishonest declaration. In contrast, we …nd no evidence of an e¤ect of joint decision-making or an interaction between both dimensions. For declaration behavior, the coe¢ cient for joint decision-making is even smaller than for reporting behavior. This is also re‡ected by the average marginal e¤ects: the e¤ect of shared liability is stable and between 11 to 13 percentage points, while the (non-signi…cant) e¤ect of joint decision-making is only 1-2 percentage points. Two alternative speci…cations con…rm the robustness of our …ndings: speci…cation (3) includes all post-experimental tests (Risk attitudes, Cognitive Re ‡ection Test, and Social Value Orientation) while speci…cation (4) controls for early periods (periods 1 to 3). As for reporting behavior, more risk-taking and better performance in the Cognitive Re ‡ection Test is correlated to a higher non-compliance for declarations. In contrast, we do not …nd an e¤ect for social preferences.
Finally, the fraction of dishonest declarations is signi…cantly smaller in early periods. As for the report of the own income, we …nd no evidence for Hypothesis 1, but we con…rm Hypothesis 2.
